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ABSTRACT
The Nordic countries have traditionally been praised for their
generous and advanced development policies. Recently, however,
it has been claimed that the Nordic model has faded: that the
Nordic donors have become more similar to other European
donors. One possible reason for such trends is inﬂuences from EU
policies, that is, Europeanisation. This article critically evaluates
such claims by presenting arguments for and against
Europeanisation effects. We argue that changes have indeed
taken place. The Nordic exceptionalism has been eroded. At the
same time, a convergence of European aid policies has occurred.
The question is if this is the consequence of Europeanisation – or
is it rather a result of Nordicisation (the Nordic countries
inﬂuencing the EU), or perhaps like-mindisation (a broader set of
progressive member states having impact upon EU policies)? We
suggest that Europeanisation has been extremely weak while
there is strong evidence of Nordicisation but also, and
increasingly, of like-mindisation. Today, a core group of mainly
northern member states, including the Nordics, are the main
driving forces behind European aid convergence.
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Introduction
The Nordic countries – here referring to Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden1 – have
traditionally been praised for their generous and advanced development policies. The
‘Nordic model’ has, for instance, included a large share of multilateral assistance, a focus
on low-income countries, and a large portion of grant aid. It has also placed signiﬁcant
emphasis on democracy, gender, environment and human right (Pratt, 1989; Stokke,
1989; Selbervik with Nygaard, 2006). In recent years, this idyllic picture has been chal-
lenged. It has been claimed that the Nordic model has faded and that Nordic donors
have become more similar to other European donors, but also that their development pol-
icies have taken off in different directions, at least to a certain extent and in some respects
(Odén, 2011; Olsen, 2013). One possible reason for such trends is pressure or indirect inﬂu-
ence from the European Union (EU). This article critically evaluates such claims by present-
ing arguments for and against Europeanisation effects. In doing so, it makes a distinction
between four aspects of development policy: structures, values and norms, instruments
and practices.
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We argue that changes have indeed taken place. The Nordic exceptionalism that
existed up until the 1990s has been eroded, though still visible in certain areas, and the
foreign aid of individual Nordic countries has to a certain extent diverged in their
emphases and foci. At the same time, a convergence of European aid policies has
occurred. The question is if these changes are the consequence of Europeanisation (i.e.
the EU inﬂuencing member states), or whether they rather are a result of Nordicisation
(i.e. the Nordic countries inﬂuencing the EU but also other member states), or perhaps
like-mindisation (i.e. a broader set of progressive member states impacting upon EU pol-
icies). We suggest that in the case of the Nordic states, Europeanisation has been extre-
mely weak. We also argue that strong Nordic attitudes of superiority (‘what have we to
learn from the EU?’) and strong identities as ‘good donors’ have obstructed Europeanisa-
tion and fostered a feeling that it is the Nordics that have inﬂuenced the EU, and not vice
versa. On the other hand, there is strong evidence of Nordicisation but also, and increas-
ingly, of ‘like-mindisation’. Today, a core group of like-minded countries, including the
Nordics, are the main driving forces behind European aid convergence.
The article starts with a brief discussion of how it relates to the conceptual framework
presented by Orbie and Carbone (2015) in the introduction to this volume, followed by
a short section on methods and sources of evidence. Then, it brieﬂy recapitulates the
main elements of the ‘Nordic model’. The empirical section analyses the degree of
erosion of this model, specifying on what levels and to what extent change has actually
taken place. The next section concentrates on the cause(s) of change, asking whether it
is a result of Europeanisation, or rather a consequence of Nordicisation or ‘like-mindisation’.
Finally, the conclusion looks at the reasons behind the lack of Europeanisation in the Nordic
case and discusses future trends and developments.
Conceptual issues and methodological considerations
Following Orbie and Carbone (2015), Europeanisation is seen here primarily as a top-down
phenomenon, where elements of EU policies are adopted by EU member states. We will,
however, also refer to policy transfers in the opposite direction (i.e. bottom-up Europeani-
sation), as it is in the Nordic debate often taken for granted that ideas of Nordic foreign aid
have more often inﬂuenced the EU than vice versa, and also inﬂuence going from some EU
member states to others (i.e. horizontal Europeanisation). While Orbie and Carbone (2015)
distinguish between Europeanisation of policy, polity and politics, our focus will mainly be
on policies, which refer to ‘instruments, objectives and discourses in a speciﬁc domain’,
though we will also brieﬂy discuss institutional changes.
It is also fruitful to make further distinctions within the broad category of ‘policy’. Our
motive for this is the empirical observation that EU may impact upon some aspects of
policy, while hardly affecting others at all. Europeanisation may thus be uneven and
patchy, depending on what aspect of development policy we look at. Against this back-
ground, we differentiate between (potential) effects on structures, values and norms,
instruments and practices of foreign aid. Structures in this context concern the volume
of aid and selection of recipients. Values and norms refer to the overarching objectives
of foreign development policy and the priorities made between them, and are primarily
revealed by discursive practices. It is here important both to scrutinise development pol-
icies in a broad sense and foreign aid policy more speciﬁcally. Instruments imply the major
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modes of giving aid, including choices between project aid, budget support, and aid via
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Practices, ﬁnally, indicate what donors do on
the ground, how their ofﬁces in developing countries work in order to carry out their mis-
sions, including patterns of co-ordination.
As pointed out by Orbie and Carbone (2015), it is remarkably difﬁcult to pinpoint the
existence and extent of Europeanisation. In the case of the Nordic countries, these have
for a long time had well-deﬁned policies and practices, situated in well-developed insti-
tutional settings. They have by many been considered to be at the forefront of develop-
ment policy with generous and altruistic programmes. The EU’s development agenda has
often been considered as less advanced, being a compromise between groups of member
states with various backgrounds and interests. For this reason, one would hardly expect to
ﬁnd much of EU inﬂuences on Nordic development policies: any such inﬂuences would be
expected to have occurred in recent years. To determine Europeanisation, EU policy
change must precede domestic change. We must also be able to discern a logical chain
or mechanism between the two changes.
This article relies on existing scholarly sources, ofﬁcial documents and reports such as
the peer reviews of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), and qualitative semi-
structured interviews with Nordic aid ofﬁcials. We connect to a discourse on Nordic inter-
nationalism, which subscribes to the idea of Nordic exceptionalism and argues that the
Nordics have acted, and are perhaps still acting, as norm entrepreneurs on the global
arena (Lawler, 1997, 2007; Ingebritsen, 2002; Browning, 2007). There are number of
detailed descriptions and analyses of the traditional Nordic model, but also of changes
in policy and practises. Some of the latter concern aid policy speciﬁcally (Selbervik with
Nygaard, 2006; Development Today, 2010; Odén, 2011), others discuss Nordic Africa pol-
icies and development policy more generally (Olsen, 2011, 2013) and still others only
Swedish aid policy change (Odén & Wohlgemuth, 2006). None of these studies have,
however, been primarily guided by a Europeanisation perspective. Many of these
sources are based on interviews with large numbers of aid practitioners in the Nordic
countries and therefore rest on solid empirical data. We have complemented this material
with interviews with ofﬁcials working at headquarters’ level and in aid agencies in the ﬁeld.
More speciﬁcally, four interviews were conducted by telephone with Swedish ofﬁcials inti-
mately involved in EU-Swedish aid relations, of which two in Stockholm and two in Brus-
sels. The analysis on aid practices is based on nine semi-structured interviews carried out in
2011 and 2012 in Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzania) and Lusaka (Zambia) with ofﬁcials representing
Denmark, Finland and Sweden.
The traditional Nordic aid model
Nordic experts on development policy agree on the existence in the 1970s, 1980s and
1990s of a ‘Nordic aid model’ (Development Today, 2010; Odén, 2011) and of ‘Nordic
exceptionalism’ (Selbervik with Nygaard, 2006; Olsen, 2013). Denmark, Finland, Norway
and Sweden stood out as generous donors, driven by solidarity, altruism, moral and huma-
nitarian concerns, rather than material interests. While there were, and are, certainly differ-
ences between these countries – with Finland often seen as the ‘odd man out’ in terms of
less generosity, and with Denmark and Finland demonstrating more aid tied to domestic
interests – we will treat them as one group.
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The Nordic uniqueness in development policy should be seen in the light of a broader
discourse on the Nordics as value-driven ‘norm entrepreneurs’ (Lawler, 1997, 2007; Ingeb-
ritsen, 2002; Olsen, 2013), ‘humane internationalists’ (Pratt, 1989; Stokke, 1989), trying to
spread the norms they cherish to other actors, by persuasion and by acting as role
models. Foreign assistance is usually considered a key instrument in these efforts, but
references are also made to, for example, environmental policy and conﬂict resolution.
The Nordic states have for decades provided more assistance to developing countries
than the DAC average. Their aid levels have generally been above 0.7 per cent of GNI
(Gross National Income) while the DAC average has been between 0.2 and 0.4 per cent
(Selbervik with Nygaard, 2006; Delputte et al., 2015). Moreover, foreign aid has been
mainly given as grants and has had a strong focus on low-income countries: for instance,
in the 1990s, Sweden, Norway and Denmark allocated on average 50 per cent, or more, of
their bilateral aid to sub-Saharan Africa (Selbervik with Nygaard, 2006). Nordic foreign
assistance has traditionally featured a strong poverty orientation and a focus on social
infrastructure and welfare. Much aid has thus been distributed to health, education,
water and sanitation. Another strong focus has been on good governance, especially
since the 1990s, and on women’s rights (Selbervik with Nygaard, 2006; Development
Today, 2010). Nordic donors have also demonstrated a stronger support for multilateral-
ism, and not least for the UN aid system, than other donors (Odén, 2011). Denmark and
Norway, for example, for many years had a policy indicating a 50–50 split between bilateral
and multilateral aid (Selbervik with Nygaard, 2006). The Nordic countries have favoured a
distinction between aid and export funding and have, at least up to the mid-1980s,
expressed a critical distance from the policies of the International Financial Institutions
(Odén, 2011). In principle, if not always in practice, there has been a strong emphasis
on recipient ownership, conceiving development relations as partnership (Odén & Wohl-
gemuth, 2006).
We can thus clearly distinguish a traditional Nordic aid model, despite the differences
that exist between the countries. In the next section, we turn to the question whether this
Nordic exceptionalism is still there. To what extent have changes taken place in the Nordic
model, how far-reaching are these changes, and do they concern all aspects of develop-
ment policy or just a few of them?
Changes in Nordic development policies
In brief, the Nordic donors are still different compared to most other donors – but much
less so than 20 years ago. Two important caveats are in order. First and foremost, the
Nordics are today not the only countries within the EU with such progressive policies,
and not necessarily the most important ones. References are often made to the ‘like-
minded countries’ or to the ‘Nordic Plus’ donors (including also the Netherlands, the
United Kingdom and Ireland), both at headquarter level and in the ﬁeld (Selbervik with
Nygaard, 2006; Olsen, 2013; Interviews 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8). In some areas, the UK, for
example, may be more progressive than the Nordic group. Also at the level of aid practices,
the ‘Nordic Plus’ donors have played a distinctive role in implementing the international
aid effectiveness principles – not the least in countries like Tanzania and Zambia, which
have been considered successful examples of recipient-led efforts to manage relations
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with donors. This belonging to a larger club obviously diminishes the exceptionalism of
the Nordic countries.
Second, the differences between the four Nordics seem to have grown. According to
Olsen (2013, p. 421), ‘the traditional Nordic aid cooperation has faltered somewhat…
cooperation with the other Nordics is no longer a priority’. Norway, being outside the
EU (though still often following EU policies), is claimed to have ‘become a lonely player’
(Development Today, 2010, p. 5) or a ‘free-wheeler’ (Odén, 2011, p. 48), giving Oslo a
higher degree of freedom of action, but also less chance to inﬂuence the policies of the
EU. Within the European Union, the Nordics do not any longer necessarily form the ideo-
logical core and may prefer to work in other constellations within the framework of the
like-minded countries. Recently, references have been made to ‘the Nordic Plus Plus’,
varying from issue-area to issue-area but often including also France and Germany and
sometimes Poland and Spain (Interviews 1, 4). This indicates a spread of Nordic aid ideol-
ogy to a larger group of countries – thereby increasing its political weight considerably. In
development circles in Brussels as well as in the ﬁeld, references are increasingly made to
the ‘like-minded countries’ than to ‘the Nordics’ (Interviews 4, 5).
When turning to an analysis of the aspects of development policy deﬁned above, we
see a diverse and somewhat heterogeneous picture. Still, the general picture is one of
very limited Europeanisation. On the structural level, the aid budgets of the Nordics are
still well above the DAC average. Despite economic and budgetary difﬁculties – admittedly
of a lesser magnitude than in most other EU donors – they have kept up their levels of
foreign assistance. While Denmark, Sweden and Norway continue to provide far more
than 0.7 per cent Ofﬁcial Development Assistance (ODA)/GNI, Finland has also stepped
up its aid efforts and remains committed to reaching the internationally agreed aid
target by 2015 (OECD-DAC, 2014; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2014). They all
still give more than others to multilateral institutions, between 25 and 30 per cent of
their total aid, and large quantities (around 60 per cent of their total aid) to LDCs, with con-
tributions to sub-Saharan Africa accounting for in between 40 and 50 per cent (OECD-DAC,
2011, 2012, 2013a, 2013b).
The underlying motive for giving foreign assistance has remained virtually the same
during 60 years of aid giving. Founded in domestic principles and given the lack of colonial
history, international solidarity became the cornerstone of Nordic assistance programmes
already from the beginning (Odén &Wohlgemuth, 2006). Furthermore, the main aid objec-
tives have also remained approximately the same. In the Swedish case, a government bill
of 1962 laid the foundations for the country’s aid policy and its principles have continued
to guide Swedish assistance over the years to a surprising extent. The ﬁght against poverty
has always been the overarching goal, while economic growth, equal distribution of
resources and a support for recipient states’ responsibility for their own development
were basic elements of Swedish policy, later complemented by environmental concerns
and gender equality as additional objectives (Odén & Wohlgemuth, 2006). Poverty
reduction also remains the overarching goal of Danish development cooperation, after
it was established as a central objective in the 1971 Act on International Development
Co-operation. Issues like the environment, gender equality and human rights have been
added as important elements in the 1980s (OECD-DAC, 2011; Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of Denmark, 2014). Norwegian and Finnish development policies also show continuity
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when it comes to focussing on the primary objectives of poverty reduction and sustainable
development (OECD-DAC, 2012, 2013b).
In recent years, priorities have, however, changed, at least to a certain extent. More
emphasis has been put on the importance of the private sector for economic growth,
as well as on the perceived necessity to integrate poorer countries into the global
economy (Odén, 2011). We can thus witness a greater attention to ‘the market’ as a
mover of prosperity and development, and consequently relative less focus on ‘the
state’ as the main force behind development – a clear change compared to the 1970s
and 1980s (cf. Harman & Williams, 2014). This evolution also involves a greater emphasis
on the expansion of Nordic countries’ business and investments in developing countries
(OECD-DAC, 2011, 2012, 2013a, 2013b). Another development is the increasing attention
to good governance and human rights (Odén, 2011), a theme that has been visible from
the beginning but has more and more been made a centrepiece of Nordic development
strategies. Next, development policies have come to prioritise policy coherence for devel-
opment (Stochetti, 2013). This was an insight that came from the realisation that sector
policies sometimes contradicted each other and that development concerns often came
out as losers when competing with commercial or security interests. Nordic donors
have introduced mechanisms and policy processes to guarantee that all relevant policy
areas – be it trade policy, agricultural policy, security policy or migration policy – work
for the same goal: sustainable development.
However, while its importance has been increasingly emphasised, not least as a result of
Swedish government policy initiatives (Odén, 2011; Interview 1), the fact that different pol-
itical and administrative institutions are in charge of different sector policies makes policy
coherence a daunting challenge. For example, although Norway has established formal
and informal mechanisms for inter-ministerial co-ordination and policy arbitration,
actual efforts remain issue-speciﬁc and ad hoc (OECD-DAC, 2013b). Moroever, when
looking at development policy in a broad sense, links between development and security
concerns have been increasingly put into focus. Besides changes in discourse in this direc-
tion, Nordic countries have allocated more assistance to conﬂict areas, but where EU forces
have been involved as peacekeepers (cf. Development Today, 2010; Olsen, 2013).
Considering aid modalities and policy instruments, it can ﬁrst be noted that sector allo-
cations have shifted, following international trends (Odén & Wohlgemuth, 2006). While
health, education, infrastructural and rural development projects have always been
present in aid programmes, we have since the Millennium seen a growing emphasis on
new policy ﬁelds, including support for conﬂict prevention, democracy and private
business initiatives. Nordic donors’ development strategies show a clear commitment to
align their aid with partner countries’ national priorities and make use of their institutions
and systems. A trend towards programme-based approaches, associated with the belief in
the virtue of recipient country ownership, is clearly visible. They have provided more
budget support than the OECD-DAC average – especially in countries like Tanzania,
Zambia or Mozambique, where substantial shares of their budgets have been provided
through the state (OECD-DAC, 2011, 2012, 2013a, 2013b). However, in recent years, this
picture has changed as the use of budget support has decreased and a shift in focus is
taking place from general to sector budget support. In 2010, Denmark was the only
Nordic donor that reached the target of providing 66 per cent of aid ﬂows in the form
of programme-based approaches (OECD, 2011).
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Regarding the actual implementation of aid policy on the ground, there is little evi-
dence of major change due to EU co-ordination efforts (Delputte & Orbie, 2014; see
also Carbone, 2013). Aid implementation being highly decentralised in the Nordic states
(Selbervik with Nygaard, 2006), these countries’ development ofﬁces and embassies in
developing countries have become sites of considerable expertise. This is obviously one
factor that has spoken against increased co-ordination within the framework of the EU.
Co-ordination, when existing, has been with the other Nordic donors, or – in recent
years – increasingly with other like-minded countries (within the ‘Nordic Plus’ framework)
(Interview 4; Odén, 2011; Olsen, 2011). In those countries that have been considered ‘best
practices’ in the implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda, important steps towards
aid co-ordination were initiated by Nordic countries already at the end of the 1990s, in
close cooperation with the government and other like-minded donors. Hence, at the
time the EU’s policy framework on aid effectiveness was adopted, aid co-ordination
based on Joint Assistance Strategies was already far advanced. Our interviews show
that the EU’s co-ordinator role in Tanzania and Zambia is rather limited (Interviews 5, 6,
11, 12). For Nordic donors, the EU does not offer much added value to the existing
formal and informal coordination processes (Interview 5, 6, 7, 11, 13). Not only because
non-EU like-minded donors such as Norway are excluded, but also because EU coordi-
nation is perceived as being driven by EU visibility considerations rather than by a
concern to improve aid delivery (Interview 10).
To summarise, while changes, although not drastic, can be detected in Nordic policy
objectives and instruments during the time period after the Danish, Finnish and
Swedish accessions to the EU in 1995, no such traces are visible either in the structural
aspects discussed above, or on the ground. The changes that we have observed rather
consist of additional elements to an existing structure of goals and instruments than of
shifts in essential features of policy. In the next section, we will discuss if the changes
that have taken place may be interpreted as signs of ongoing Europeanisation processes.
Europeanisation, Nordicisation or like-mindisation?
Above, we have identiﬁed a number of elements that have been introduced into Nordic
development policy during the last two decades or so. Similar conclusions, pointing in
the direction of a noticeable but still limited erosion of the Nordic aid model, are drawn
in existing literature. Some of these publications furthermore argue that we can see a
clear ongoing convergence of European development policies (Carbone, 2007; Olsen,
2013; Zemanová, 2012). The policies of the EU itself have undergone continuous
changes. Many EU member states have, more or less thoroughly, carried out reforms of
their policies, often resulting in policies and strategies that are more similar to traditional
Nordic aid practices than before. We have already underlined the emergence of a ‘Nordic
Plus’ constellation of ‘like-minded countries’, including the UK, Ireland and the Netherlands
besides the Nordics and the more recent emergence of a ‘Nordic Plus Plus’ coalition. Such
groups of countries with progressive ideas, differing across issue-areas, today exert con-
siderable inﬂuence on EU policy (cf. Olsen, 2013, p. 421). Other long-standing members
have also introduced novel elements into their aid arsenal, while newer member states
in eastern and southern Europe have created entirely new structures and policies after
their accession to the Union (Zemanová, 2012; Lightfoot & Szent-Ivanyi, 2014). The
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result has arguably been an EU where both member state policies and EU policy have con-
verged, and now demonstrate many more similar traits and features than ever before.
According to one interviewee, the EU is today ‘very much speaking with one voice’ in
aid policy (Interview 1). Another interviewee described the existence of a ‘European con-
sensus’, where actors are in agreement on 98 per cent of all policies (Interview 2). This con-
vergence is mirrored in the new ‘Agenda for Change’ policy of 2012 (Interview 4).
The question then is if the changes in Nordic development policies and the tendencies
described above are the consequence of Europeanisation, of Nordicisation, or of ‘like-
mindisation’ (the ‘Nordic Plus’ having had similar inﬂuences). Evidence of a Europeanisa-
tion of Nordic policies is very hard to ﬁnd, although ‘non-governmental sources’ are
reported to have stressed that ‘the general trend in Swedish EU policy since 1995 has
been one of adjustment to the EU and to its policies’ (Olsen, 2013, p. 415). Brommesson
(2010, p. 228; on Europeanisation of Nordic security policies, see Rieker, 2004) introduced
the concept of ‘normative Europeanization’, referring to ‘a top-down process based on the
logic of appropriateness, where states with a close relationship to the EU, i.e. candidate
and member states, develop a commitment to a European centre… and their normative
point of departure is changed’. A European loyalty becomes the point of reference, rather
than national loyalty. According to Brommesson (2010), tendencies of normative Europea-
nisation of Swedish foreign policy can be detected. Is the same true for development
policy? The Nordic states are in general well known for their propensity to follow and
implement EU directives (Falkner & Treib, 2008), and this could speak in favour of an
inclusion of EU values in this policy area, too. However, the Nordics have been extremely
proud of their aid record and their aid policies, which have generally (and not only in the
North) been considered progressive and at the forefront of international discourses. Mir-
roring this image, there seems to have been a tendency in aid circles (notably in aid
agencies and within the NGO community), especially when the Nordics became EU
members in 1995, to regard EU foreign assistance as much less advanced and much
less progressive. The idea that ‘we have something to learn from the EU’ appears to
have been far-fetched for many Nordic politicians and practitioners (Interviews 1, 4). EU
aid was considered ‘outmoded’ and its aid structures were considered frustratingly
bureaucratic and ineffective (Interview 1). These bureaucratic constraints also constitute
a factor in Nordic donors’ perceptions of EU delegations in the ﬁeld. In Tanzania and
Zambia, the EU’s complex aid bureaucracy and lack of ﬂexibility was ﬁercely criticised as
it results in decisions and initiatives that are not always aligned to the local situation (Inter-
views 6, 8, 11). Some Nordic ofﬁcials raised the idea that in some respects the EU ‘could
learn from some of the member states’, and not the least from the Nordic (plus) donors
(Interviews 6, 8). The Nordic self-image is in strong contrast with these perceptions of
the EU: ‘we just have different ways of looking at things, we trust people much more
because we’re not working on perverse incentives, we are actually working on the right
incentives to try to achieve the greater good’ (Interview 6). From this perspective,
increased EU coordination would mean that they ‘would have to compromise’, which
‘would have a negative impact on [their] joint positions’ (Interview 5). Such attitudes
obviously speak against any impact of ideas stemming from the EU.
Our focus on strong Nordic identities (as ‘best in class, advanced aid donors’) and on the
long traditions of giving generous aid according to a ‘Nordic model’ as key explanatory
factors behind the absence of Europeanisation is theoretically closely linked to sociological
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and historical institutionalism. Sociological institutionalism is interested in the capacity of
cultural and organisational practices (institutions) to mould the preferences and interests
of actors (Rosamond, 2000). People act according to a logic of appropriateness, ‘taking
cues from their institutional environment as they construct their preferences’ (Pollack,
2009, p. 127). Policies are thus shaped by institutional and national identities. Historical
institutionalism focuses on the effects of institutions over time. Institutional choices
taken in the past tend to persist, thereby shaping and constraining actors later in time.
Actors are loath to abandon existing policies, adapting them only incrementally to
changes in the environment (Pollack, 2009). Both theories may help to explain the ten-
dency among Nordic aid bureaucrats and politicians to stick with existing institutions
and policies and to be sceptical to external ideas.
Attitudes may, however, have changed gradually over the years. One of our intervie-
wees thus argued that Nordic aid ofﬁcials today are much more open to ideational inﬂu-
ences from other EU actors and more sympathetic to other countries’ ‘ideological hobby-
horses’ (Interview 2). To the extent that this is the case, this may be evidence of a growing
feeling of ‘EU solidarity’ as a result of an ongoing socialisation process. Representatives
from the like-minded countries are in contact frequently and ‘active orchestration’ takes
place in Council working groups (Interview 4). Such socialisation processes, arguably a
result of ‘normative suasion’ (Lewis, 2005), have been observed elsewhere in everyday
decision making in the EU, for example in COREPER where Lewis (2005, p. 937) found
an ‘adherence to a set of norm-guided rules and principled beliefs in collectively legitimat-
ing arguments and making decisions’ and where ‘the stamp of collectively negotiated
standards of appropriateness is unmistakable’ (Lewis, 2005, p. 952). Also at the ﬁeld
level, informal coordination with like-minded donors such as the UK and the Netherlands
takes place on a regularly basis (Interviews 5, 9).
Empirically, there might arguably be inﬂuences from the EU’s long-standing focus on
market forces and the importance of private business in its development policy, as
expressed for example in the Lomé Convention with the African, Caribbean and Paciﬁc
group of countries. Certainly, there has been an increasing emphasis on these aspects
in Nordic aid recently, appearing well after such elements appeared in EU policy. On
the other hand, there are also international trends here to reckon with, which point in
exactly the same direction (Fejerskov, 2013). A totally transformed aid landscape, with
many more ﬁnancial ﬂows to take note of and a diminished role for governmental assist-
ance, had created a situation where private actors ‘had to be taken into account’ (Interview
1).2 Another potential area of Europeanisation is the increasing securitisation of foreign
aid. For example, we have recently witnessed more Nordic assistance going to countries
where the Nordic states are involved in peace-keeping missions. However, the links
between security and development have not only been underlined in EU discourses,
but also in international discourse in general, especially since the events of 9/11. Evidence
of normative Europeanisation is very limited – and inconclusive as these shifts in ideational
priorities may also have resulted from international ideological currents.
Is there then any more solid evidence of a Nordicisation of EU policies? Browning (2007,
p. 44) argues that internationalist and solidarist elements of Nordic foreign policy have
become part of the EU’s international proﬁle, and sees this as a ‘success for Nordic
ideals and the Nordic model’. In ofﬁcial documents on foreign aid, the Nordics have
stressed the importance, and the possibility, of inﬂuencing EU policies towards Africa
EUROPEAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 9
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(Odén, 2011, p. 39). Aid practitioners uniformly discard the notion that EU policies should
have had any signiﬁcant inﬂuence on Nordic aid policies, and instead pay tribute to the
beneﬁcial effects of Nordic inﬂuence on EU norms and values (Interviews 1, 3, 4).
Gender equality, increased transparency and a stronger focus on poverty eradication
are often cited examples of Nordic ideational inﬂuence (Interviews 1, 2, 3, 4). Such norm
transfers may take place in many settings. Gender issues are thus regularly brought to
the fore by Nordic delegates in all situations and in all groupings having to do with aid
(Interview 3). Not least important is the normative suasion that takes place in expert
groups where ofﬁcials from more ‘advanced’ member states teach ‘correct’ norms to
their colleagues. Examples include the linking of human rights and democracy concerns
to budget aid allocation (Interviews 1, 4) and the spreading of gender norms. In the
latter ﬁeld, the European Commission in the early 2000s had little expertise, giving
much leeway for Nordic delegates to propagate their ideals and to exert inﬂuence
through expert committees (Elgström, 2000).
Olsen (2013) has investigated the possibility of Nordicisation in a recent article, with a
focus on the EU’s Africa policy. Referring to an analysis of ﬁve separate cases involving pol-
icies towards Africa, he ﬁnds that the case of policies towards Zimbabwe ‘may show it is
possible for small Nordic countries to inﬂuence the Africa policy of the European Union’
(Olsen, 2013, p. 415). Likewise, the 2005 European Consensus on Development ‘may be
interpreted as an illustration of Nordicisation’, as the Nordics initiated the debate on Euro-
pean aid harmonisation and coherence and suggested the content of the policies that
ensued (cf. Odén, 2011, p. 30; Olsen, 2013, p. 420). The Nordic countries thus arguably
demonstrated agenda-setting power in this instance.
However, Olsen (2013, p. 420) adds that in both cases the Nordic states worked in close
co-operation with a number of like-minded countries. Thus, ‘Denmark, Sweden and
Norway have close and positive working relationships with the UK, the Netherlands and
Ireland on the issues of aid harmonisation and in particular on the improvement of the
delivery of development aid’. Arguably, the origins of the EU’s aid effectiveness framework,
which is guided by the principle of complementarity and elaborated in the Code of
Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour (2007), can be found in the
‘Nordic Plus’ Complementarity Principles (2005) which inspired the Joint Assistance Strat-
egy processes in the ﬁeld. One interviewee gave the growing importance placed on ‘soft
values’ in EU discourse and policy, clearly expressed in the 2012 ‘Agenda for Change’, as
another example of like-minded country inﬂuence (Interview 1). These examples can thus
be interpreted as illustrations of ‘like-mindisation’, with a coalition of ideologically similar,
progressive countries working in tandem to inﬂuence EU policies, rather than as proofs of
Nordicisation per se. Our conclusion is that we witness a process where a broader group of
progressive member states are increasingly becoming the driving forces behind European
aid convergence. Nordicisation as such is giving way to ‘like-mindisation’. One or several of
the Nordic countries are still often key players but in various combinations with other
member states. At the same time, there may be a ‘melding of the Nordic brand of inter-
nationalism with Western/European internationalist approaches’ (Browning, 2007, p. 45).
The role of the Nordics in the ongoing process of ‘like-mindisation’ is an intriguing ques-
tion as it is linked to the debate on norm diffusion within the EU. It may be that the Nordic
countries, or some of them, have acted as norm entrepreneurs within the EU, changing the
priorities, positions and perhaps even values of fellow member states – as claimed by de
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Felice (2015) in this volume. In a survey of 249 state representatives in Council working
groups, Sweden was ranked number four and Denmark number seven of all EU
members in having the potential to inﬂuence the positions of other member states
(Naurin, 2015), indicating that there is indeed a possibility for norm diffusion. There are,
however, also other possibilities: policies may change as the result of domestic political
changes (a new government with different aid ideology taking power) and governments
may of course also be inspired by ideational signals from international actors, outside
the EU.
Summary and a concluding discussion on future trends
In this article, we have investigated the impact of Europeanisation – if any – on Nordic
development and aid policies. Our main ﬁnding is that such inﬂuences have been very
limited. Some aspects of policy (larger aid ﬂows and others structural characteristics,
but also the speciﬁc character of aid practices on the ground) have not changed at all,
or to a very limited extent, while we have witnessed additions to the set of aid objectives
and instruments of the Nordic countries, indicating a limited degree of absorption of novel
policy elements. These possible signs of Europeanisation can, however, better be
explained by impulses from the global aid debate that have inﬂuenced the EU and the
member states alike (cf. Harman & Williams, 2014). It is well known that aid has its fads
and fashions that are closely followed by most donors. During the last 15–20 years, the
increasing emphasis placed on trade ﬂows and on co-operation with the private sector
in aid has resulted in a dramatically changed environment for traditional inter-governmen-
tal foreign assistance (Interviews 1, 3, 4). This development has arguably given rise to new
debates and new trends in aid giving, further strengthening the overall importance of
global transnational ideological inﬂuences.
We have also highlighted the convincing arguments for, and examples of, Nordicisation
and, increasingly more important, of what we have called ‘like-mindisation’: the impact of
an ideological core of progressive member states, which includes the Nordics but also
some heavy players on the European stage, like the UK, the Netherlands and more recently
also, in certain issue-areas, France and Germany. The result has been a convergence of
European aid policies and practices. Nordic exceptionalism is still there – but much less
visibly so than before the turn of the century.
How can the lack of Europeanisation be explained? The simple answer is that the Nordic
countries already had well-developed foreign aid policies when they (excluding of course
Norway) became EU members and that these policies were considered – not least, but not
only, by politicians and practitioners in the Nordic countries – to be both more generous
and more progressive than the existing EU aid policy. There was, consequently, no
demand for ideational inputs from the EU level. The lack of ideational ﬁt (cf. Lightfoot &
Szent-Ivanyi, 2014) that existed was by the Nordics seen as something that should be
solved through normative changes in the EU, and not the other way round. Therefore
the emphasis voiced in the Nordic countries on the opportunities for norm spread
within the EU, that is, on potential Nordicisation. The attitude that ‘we have nothing to
learn from the EU’ may still be there, but has been more and more replaced, as EU
policy has gradually become more ambitious, by a feeling that ‘we are all working
within the EU with the same goal, to improve aid policy and practices, and we Nordics
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have something to contribute within this process’ (Interviews 1, 4). This could pave the way
for joint efforts to improve aid practices, with the aim of making EU aid more effective.
Will we see more of Europeanisation in the years to come? On the structural level of
policy, we can perhaps expect Europeanisation – but not concerning the Nordic
member states. Their high aid budgets, and their focus on multilateral aid and grants,
do not seem to be threatened and have withstood the economic strains of recent
years. On the other hand, pressure from the European Commission – and from recipients
and NGOs – for increased aid budgets in other, today less generous, EU member states will
continue. If it will succeed is another matter, and to a large extent depends on the state of
the European economy. Therefore, we can expect Nordic exceptionalism in these areas to
continue for a foreseeable future. Neither can we expect Europeanisation in the case of aid
objectives. Changes in this respect will probably come, but then as the result of global
development trends, rather than of EU initiatives. There seems to a bigger chance for a
Europeanisation of aid instruments and of co-ordination on the ground. In order to
compete with other emerging donors (nota bene, China and India) for inﬂuence in the
developing world, Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi (2014, p. 14) argue that the EU ‘must act
in a more concerted and coherent way’. Furthermore, the creation of the European Exter-
nal Action Service will probably lead to renewed and strengthened efforts of EU foreign
aid co-ordination in recipient countries. The recent introduction of joint programming
in many recipient countries is also gradually involving more countries in ﬁeld co-ordination
(Interviews 3, 4). There is, we expect, a willingness in Denmark, Finland and Sweden to
comply with such pressures in order to demonstrate their commitment to EU unity and
to initiatives to increase the effectiveness of European aid. If this will actually result in
real changes in practices and co-operation patterns on the ground depends on the Euro-
pean Union’s ability to implement its ambitious plans.
Disclosure statement
No potential conﬂict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1. The ﬁfth Nordic country, Iceland, is an insigniﬁcant aid donor and not a member of the EU.
Norway is also outside the EU, but is an important donor and has traditionally co-operated
closely with the Nordic EU members.
2. As a result, the increased participation of the private sector in development aid is one of the key
features of the Busan Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation.
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